Forthcoming in the June 2009 issue of New Internationalist (under the title ‘The Cultural Crusades’), this essay was commissioned as a discussion of the question whether, and how, China’s overseas Confucius Institutes are a manifestation of ‘soft power.’ It starts, however, by considering the changing fortunes of Confucianism within China.
Half way through my twelve years in China I discovered that an office manager I had just taken on spent his every free moment reading ancient Buddhist texts. At first I connected this to the trauma of a close shave with death in a car crash that had left him permanently disabled. But when I looked further I realized that the personal quest for meaning was widespread in our small office.
Two other close colleagues were interested in Tibetan Buddhism (and quite passionate about Tibet.) Another attended an ‘underground’ Christian church. Then there was the cleaner who also cooked us wonderful lunches. A retired factory worker whose ‘work-unit’ pension had evaporated when the factory went bankrupt, she quietly joined the ranks of the quasi-Buddhist Falun Gong: a movement which blended spiritual teachings with breathing techniques and exercises, but which the government banned in 1999. ‘Mama Liu,’ as we called her, was a kindly pillar of her community who volunteered in a youth prison. She turned up at work one day in tears because the police had raided her home, seized her Falun Gong literature, and told her to watch out or she would end up behind bars herself.
In short, the China that many outsiders were seeing as brashly materialist yet firmly under the Communist Party’s thumb was, in reality, in ideological ferment.